We study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents in a contest care about their relative position. A judicious de…nition of status categories can be used by a principal in order to in ‡uence the agents'performance. We …rst consider a pure status case where there are no tangible prizes. Our main results connect the optimal partition in status categories to properties of the distribution of ability among contestants. The top status category always contains an unique element. For distributions of abilities that have an increasing failure rate (IFR), a proliferation of status classes is optimal, while the optimal partition involves some coarseness in other cases. Moreover, for IFR distributions, a coarse partition with only two status categories achieves at least half of the output obtained in the optimal partition with a proliferation of classes. Finally, we modify the model to allow for status categories that are endogenously determined by monetary prizes of di¤erent sizes. If status is solely derived from monetary rewards, we show that the optimal partition in status classes contains only two categories.
Introduction
One of the earliest designed society structures was that of Solon's (ca. 638 BC -558 BC) timokratia, an oligarchy with a sliding scale of status determined by precisely de…ned ranges of measured output (fruit, grain, oil, etc.). Solon divided the entire population of Attica into four status classes 1 , and attached various, more or less tangible rights, to each class. Higher classes had more rights but were also expected to contribute more to the state.
The kings and queens of feudal states awarded titles of nobility such as duke (or duchess), marquis, earl, count, viscount, baron, baronet in return for special services to the crown. Initially there was a strong link between such titles and tangible assets, such as land and serfs, but this link weakened over time 2 .
Today's large corporations (such as large banks) have, besides a single president , several executive vice presidents, tens of senior vice-presidents , and several hundred "mere"vice-presidents. The New York Metropolitan Museum of Art o¤ers eight di¤erent donor categories 3 for corporate members (such as "Chairman's Circle" for donations above $100000, "Director's Circle" for donations between $60,000 and $100,000, and so on) and 10 similar categories for private members.
The common denominator to the above examples is that agents'care about social status, and that a self-interested principal is usually able to divert (or "manipulate") this concern to an avenue that is bene…cial to himself/herself.
The general importance of status concerns for explaining behavior has been long recognized by sociologists and economists 4 . Recent happiness research shows how wage rank a¤ects workers' well-being 5 , and experimental studies pointed out that social status may play a role also in market exchanges 6 .
In this paper we study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents 1 These were the Pentakosiomedimnoi, the Hippeis, the Zeugitai and the Thetes. 2 Even today's citizens of the United Kingdom are eligible for more than 50 orders and decorations, awarded for special services to the "queen". These are structured in a strict precedence system, and seem to play an important role in some parts of the public. 3 See Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad (1996) for some empirical evidence and a theoretical model that focuses on conspicuous giving. 4 See Max Weber, 1978, James S. Coleman, 1990 , Thorstein Veblen, 1934, James S. Duesenberry, 1949 , Milton Friedman and Leonard J. Savage, 1948, and Milton Friedman 1953 for some early contributions. Robert H. Frank (1985) o¤ers an entertaining account of some of the issues. 5 See Gorton Brown, Janathan Gardner, Andrew Oswald and Jian Qian ( 2004) . 6 In our present model, several agents who are privately informed about their ability engage in a contest, and are then partitioned into status categories (or classes) according to their performance.
A status category consists of all contestants who have performances in a speci…ed quantile, e.g., the top status class may consist of the individual with the highest output, the second class of individuals with the next three highest outputs, and so on... Each individual cares about the number of contestants in classes above and below him. We choose a convenient functional formulation that captures well the "zero-sum game" nature of concerns for relative position: if an individual gets higher (lower) status, one or more individuals must get lower (higher) status.
A designer (or principal) determines the number of status classes and their size in order to maximize total output. Since the contest equilibrium only depends on the structure of status classes, and not directly on the designer's goal, our type of analysis can, in principle, be performed for a variety of other goals.
We …rst analyze the "pure status"case where there are no other tangible prizes to motivate the contestants. We then extend our model to investigate a setting where the designer awards monetary prizes, and where status is purely derived from the di¤erences in monetary compensation, i.e., having a higher monetary prize per se implies higher status 7 . These two models represent opposite 7 See Arthur J. Robson, 1992, for another model where status is de…ned by wealth.
extremes, and reality is often somewhere in the middle. In most cases, we think that individuals in organizations are, at least partly, motivated by status concerns, but that status is not solely derived from the monetary payo¤s attached to various activities 8 .
Since status is a "zero-sum game", it seems, at …rst glance, that shifts in the allocation of status among agents should not a¤ect total output. The missing factor in this argument is the heterogeneity in abilities. Since higher ability will be, in equilibrium, associated with higher performance, modi…cations of classes at di¤erent levels in the hierarchy may have quite di¤erent e¤ects.
In particular, because the expected bene…t associated with a move upwards in the ranks (which is given by the expected increase in status minus the expected cost of producing an output that is su¢ cient for the upward move) depends on the bounds of the quantile de…ning the status class, a manipulation of these bounds a¤ects behavior, and hence total output.
Our results relate the structural features of the optimal partition in status categories to properties of the distribution of abilities in the society:
1) We show that, for any distribution of abilities, the top category in any optimal partition must contain a single agent. This agrees well with the ubiquitous structure of many human (or animal) organizations and social structures, and brings to mind familiar roles such as "queen", "alpha-male", "CEO", etc....
2) Given a partition in status classes, adding a new element to an arbitrary class may, in fact, reduce output. But, we show that the adoption of a policy that resembles "hiring at the lowest level" (see George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994) always makes an increase in the number of (ex-ante symmetric) contestants bene…cial to the principal.
3) We then identify the main factors leading either to a proliferation of status classes (where each individual is "in a class of his/her own") or to coarse partitions where it is optimal to have a wider range of performances bunched together in the same category. A proliferation of status classes is optimal if the distribution of abilities has an increasing failure (or hazard) rate. This …nding points in the same direction as the well known empirical fact that job titles do proliferate, but only in organizations with a relatively professional work-force (see James N. Baron and William T.
Bielby, 1986). In contrast, a coarse partition of status classes (besides the top one) may be optimal if the distribution of abilities puts less and less weight on higher an higher ability ranges.
4)
If the distribution of abilities has an increasing failure rate, we show that the optimal partition in the class of partitions with only two status categories achieves at least half the performance of the overall optimal partition. Thus, whenever there are transaction costs attached to …ner partitions, the coarsest possible non-trivial partition may be optimal 9 . This is related to an argument made by McAfee (2002) in the context of "coarse matching" of two populations.
5) Finally, we introduce monetary prizes and consider status purely induced by these prizes. In order to add realism, we assume that the designer is budget constrained, and that agents choose not to compete if the monetary prize is not enough to compensate them for a potential low status.
In this framework, we show that the optimal structure is to have exactly two status classes: the context "grading on a curve".
There are many substantial di¤erences between their model, technique and results and ours.
For their main results, Dubey and Geanakoplos focus on absolute grading, assuming that there is complete information, that students are either homogenous or have discrete types, that e¤ort choice is binary, and that the relation between e¤ort and output is stochastic. Moreover, the designer's goal is to have all students choose the higher e¤ort level out of the two possible ones. Their main …nding is that status-conscious students may be better motivated to work hard by a professor who uses coarse grading (e.g., A,B,C,D rather than 100, 99,...). This should be contrasted with our main result about the optimality of the …nest partition for a very large and ubiquitous class of distributions.
Postlewaite (1998) presents an excellent discussion on the advantages/ disadvantages of the "direct" modeling approach versus the one where a concern for relative ranking is only implicit, or "instrumental" for other goals that are made explicit (see also Cole et al., 1992) . In a nutshell, Postelwaite's argument against a direct approach is that, by adjusting utility functions at will, one can explain every phenomenon. For our purposes, the debate about the right way to model status concerns is only of secondary importance. Our main focus is on the optimal design of status classes (from an incentive point of view) given that agents care, for some direct or instrumental reason, about relative position. We view the assumed utility function as a simpli…cation, and we ask the reader to judge the outcome by Hardy's dictum whereby good science must, at least, provide some "decent" distance between assumptions and results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the contest model with status concerns, and some useful facts about order statistics. In Section 3 we derive results that connect the form of the optimal partition in status categories to various properties of the distribution of ability in the population. We …rst show that, by always adding new entrants to the lowest status category, the designer can ensure that his payo¤ is monotonically increasing in the number of contestants. Thus, potential contestants need not be excluded from competing. We next show that the top status category in any optimal partition must contain a unique element. For distribution of abilities that have an increasing hazard rate, each status category in an optimal partition will contain a unique element -thus, in this case a proliferation of status classes is optimal. We also present a simple condition, stronger than having a decreasing hazard rate, ensuring that the optimal partition involves some coarseness. Finally, we study the properties of optimal partitions with only two status categories. In Section 4 we modify the model to allow for status categories that are endogenously determined by monetary prizes of di¤erent sizes. If status is solely derived from monetary rewards, we show that the optimal partition contains only two categories, with the top category being a singleton. Section 5 concludes. Several proofs and examples are relegated to an Appendix.
The Model
We consider a contest with n players where each player j makes an e¤ort e j : For simplicity, we postulate a deterministic relation between e¤ort and output, and assume these to be equal. E¤orts are submitted simultaneously. An e¤ort e j causes a cost denoted by e j =a j ; where a j > 0 is an ability parameter.
The ability (or type) of contestant j is private information to j: Abilities are drawn independently of each other from the interval [0; 1] according to a distribution function F that is common knowledge. We assume that F has a continuous density f = dF > 0: Each player cares about the number of players in categories both below and above him, and we assume that the "pure status" prize of being in status category i is given by
Thus, a contestant is happier when he has more [less] people below [above] him. Note this formulation well captures the zero-sum nature of status: for any partition in status categories, the total value derived from status is given by :
To summarize, the timing of the game is follows: The designer chooses a partition fr i g k i=0 and commits to it. Each contestant gets then privately informed about ability. The contestants simultaneously choose e¤ort level according to their ability type. Finally, agents are partitioned into di¤erent status categories according to their e¤orts and the chosen partition.
We assume that each player maximizes the value of the expected status prize minus the expected e¤ort cost, and that the designer maximizes the value of expected total e¤ort by adjusting the partition in status classes.
We use the following notation: 1) A k;n denotes k-th order statistic out of n independent variables independently distributed according to F (note that A n;n is the highest order statistic, and so on..);
2) F k;n denotes the distribution of A k;n , and f k;n denotes its density; 3) E(k; n) denotes the expected value of A k;n . (Note that E(n; n) is the expectation of the maximum, or highest order statistic, and so on..)
The Optimal Partition in Status Categories
This section contains our main results about the structure of the optimal partition in status categories. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all agents use the same, strictly monotonic equilibrium e¤ort function . In such an equilibrium, the output rank of player j will be the same as his ability rank among the n contestants.
Let P i (a) be the probability of a player with ability a being ranked in category i; i.e., her ability is between the r i -th and r i 1 -th highest. These probabilities involve the order statistics of the distribution of abilities in the population. Applying the revelation principle, agent j with ability a chooses to behave as an agent with ability s to solve the following optimization problem:
In equilibrium, the above maximization problem must be solved by s = a: The calculation of equilibrium e¤ort functions and total expected e¤ort yields:
Theorem 1 Assume that contestants are partitioned in k status categories according to the family
Then, total expected e¤ ort in a symmetric equilibrium is given by
Proof. See Appendix.
Given the above result, we can now formulate the designer's problem: she needs to determine the number of contestants (m) and status categories (k), and the size of each category (r i ; i = 1; ::; k 1). Explicitly, we obtain the following discrete optimization problem:
The Optimal Number of Contestants
We …rst determine the optimal number of contestants by analyzing the e¤ect of changing the number of contestants (i.e., by entry or hiring) on total expected e¤ort. Given the zero-sum nature of status, the answer is not clear-cut, and it depends on the designer's reaction to entry (i.e., on how the size and number of status categories change). The following example illustrates the possibility that a wrong post-entry adjustment policy may cause total e¤ort to actually go down.
and consider only partitions with two categories. Total e¤ ort is given by E n = n(n r)E (r; n) = n(n r) n! (! + r 1)! (r 1)! (n + !)! where r is the division point. If we add an additional contestant to the higher category (that is, we do not change the value of r), we obtain for ! high enough:
That is, for su¢ ciently high !; total e¤ ort decreases in the number of players.
We show below that a designer who optimally reacts to additional entry can always ensure that total e¤ort increases. In particular, in the proof, we identify a very simple strategy (without the need of a complex re-optimization!) ensuring that total e¤ort does not decrease: faced with more contestants, the designer can just increase the size of the lowest status category.
Theorem 2 Total e¤ ort in an optimal partition increases in the number of contestants.
The Optimal Partition
Given the above result, the designer has no incentives to restrict entry in the contest, and we thus assume below that all n potential contestants are included 12 .
Since the distribution of abilities determines the expected values of the various order statistics appearing in the designer's maximization problem, the optimal number of status categories and the optimal size of each category generally depend on this distribution. Our …rst main result identi…es a robust and general feature that holds for any distribution:
Theorem 3 In any optimal partition, the top status category contains an unique element.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that the k-th (top) category contains more than one element.
Then, divide this category into two sub-categories, and denote by r d the dividing point: r k 1 < r d < n: Using the formula in Theorem 1, the di¤erence in expected e¤ort between the new and the old partitions is given by:
The inequality follows since A r d ;n stochastically dominates A r k 1 ;n :
We can interpret di¤erent status classes as di¤erent quality goods, and the expected e¤orts as the price associated with each class. When we re…ne a top category that does not consist of a unique element, the "price" (expected e¤ort input) of all status categories other than the (old) top category is unchanged. The "price" of the new second highest category is lower than before (since the corresponding agents lose their top status), but the "price" increase from the (new) top category is more than compensating this loss because this "price"comes from highest ability types that make now more e¤ort.
Our next main result identi…es a condition on the distribution of abilities that allows us to extend the above logic to all status categories. We use a statistic result about stochastic monotonicity of normalized di¤erences (also called spacings) of order statistics. We …rst need to remind the reader some well-known concepts: The failure rate (or hazard rate) of a distribution F is de…ned by: A distribution function F has increasing failure rate (IF R) if (a) is increasing or, equivalently, if log (1 F (a) ) is concave. Analogously, F has decreasing failure rate (DF R) if (a) is decreasing, or, equivalently, if log (1 F (a)) is convex 13 .
Armed with these concepts, we can now state:
Lemma 1 (Barlow and Proschan, 1966) Assume that a distribution F with F (0) = 0 satis…es IF R (DF R): Then, (n i + 1)(A i;n A i 1;n ) is stochastically decreasing (increasing) in i for a …xed n:
In other words, up to a normalizing factor, the di¤erence between the expected abilities of consecutively ranked contestants is higher at the bottom than at the top if the distribution is IF R; and the opposite holds for DF R distributions. An application of this result yields now:
Theorem 4 Assume that F; the distribution of abilities, has increasing failure rate. Then, the optimal partition is the …nest possible one: each status category contains an unique element.
The intuition behind the above result is analogous to one appearing in models of monopolistic quality/price discrimination: in "regular" setting, where marginal revenue is increasing in type (IFR is a su¢ cient condition for this to happen !), the optimal contract allocates di¤erent qualities (here di¤erent status classes) to consumers with di¤erent types. In particular, there is no pooling.
Splitting status class j in two sub-classes has two e¤ects: there is a loss of expected e¤ort (or "price") that can be obtained from placing several agents in the new lower sub-class, and a gain from agents that are now placed in the higher class (again, classes other than j are not involved).
For illustration purpose, assume that a category j has size two, and we re…ne it into two new categories, each with one element r j r d = r d r j 1 = 1: This move is advantageous if the di¤erence of expected e¤orts after and before the move is positive, i.e., if 8 < :
Most well known distributions belong to these important and much studied categories. The relationships between IF R; DF R, convexity and concavity of F are as follows: Convexity implies IF R , while DF R implies concavity. The only distribution that is both concave and convex is the uniform, while the only distribution that is both IF R and DF R is the exponential.
The …rst line is positive, because the normalized di¤erence between the expected abilities of consecutively ranked contestants is higher at the bottom than at the top if the distribution is IF R;
while the second line is positive because of usual stochastic dominance 14 .
If the distribution is concave and the IF R condition is not satis…ed, a coarse partition may be optimal . The following result yields a simple condition of "su¢ cient concavity" ensuring that the optimal partition must involve some coarseness.
Proposition 1 Assume that the number of contestants n > 2 and the distribution of abilities F are such that 15 E(2;n) E(1;n) > 2 + 2 n 2 : Then the …nest partition cannot be optimal.
Proof. Consider the …nest partition with n status categories. Remove then the lowest division point, so that the new partition with only n 1 categories contains two elements in the lowest category. The change in total e¤ort is given by
Thus, the coarser partition dominates the …nest partition if:
Example 2 Assume that the number of contestants is n = 3 and the distribution of abilities is given by F (x) = x 1=! . Since the top category of an optimal partition always contains an unique element, the quest for optimality reduces for the case n = 3 to a comparison between the …nest partition with three categories (r i = i ; i = 0; 1; 2; 3) and a partition with only two categories (r 0 = 0; r 1 = 2; r 2 = 3) . The expectations of order statistics are given by:
Thus, the su¢ cient condition for the non-optimality of the …nest partition is
It can be easily veri…ed that, for any ! > 3; the partition with only two categories is the optimal one. 1 4 The argument also indicates that the IF R condition is not necessary for class proliferation. 1 5 Recall that E (i; n) =i is increasing in i if F is concave. Thus, for any concave distribution F we get:
For any F with DF R (which is a stronger than concavity), (n i + 1)(Ai;n Ai 1;n) is stochastically increasing in i : In particular, this yields
How Good Are Partitions with Two Categories ?
We show below that, for the large and important class of IF R distributions, the designer can achieve a substantial share of the optimal performance with a simple partition in two categories.
Thus, if very …ne partitions are for some reason costly, a designer may …nd it optimal to choose the simplest non-trivial coarse partition. This seems to be a powerful argument in favor of coarse partitions.
For the special case k = 2; total e¤ort is given by
The intuition for the above expression is simple: this is a contest with (n r 1 ) equal prizes (for all those in the higher category), and each prize is worth here n (the di¤erence in payo¤s between the high and low categories).
Proposition 2 Assume that F , the distribution of abilities, has an increasing failure rate. Then, the optimal partition in the class of partitions with only two status categories yields at least half the performance obtained by the overall optimal partition.
Proof. Recall that in the IFR case, the overall optimal partition is the …nest possible one, and hence has n status categories. Thus, total e¤ort in the overall optimal partition is given by :
Total e¤ort in the optimal partition with only two categories is given by
The above approximation is rough, and the coarse partition with only two classes yields for "well-behaved" distributions a much higher percentage of the optimal performance. For example,
total for a uniform distribution of abilities. Our …nal result in this section gives further information about the optimal partition with two categories. It's proof uses the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 (Barlow and Proschan, 1966) Assume that a distribution F with F (0) = 0 is convex (concave): Then E(i; n)=i is decreasing (increasing) in i for a …xed n: Proposition 3 Let r be the division point de…ning the optimal partition in two status categories, i.e. the optimal number of contestants in the lower class. If the distribution of abilities F is convex (concave) then r ( ) n=2.
Proof. Suppose that r is the optimal division point. Then, total e¤ort in the optimal partition is higher than in any other partition. In particular, it is higher than total e¤ort in the partition where r = n r : This yields:
(n r ) E (r ; n) r E (n r ; n) , E (r ; n) r E (n r ; n) n r
By Lemma 2, we obtain that , for convex F , the last inequality above can hold only if r (n r ) which is equivalent to r n=2: Analogously, if F (x) is concave, it must be the case that r (n r ) ;which yields r n=2:
A simple corollary is, of course, that exactly half of the agents should be in the low (high) category if abilities are uniformly distributed.
Status Derived from Monetary Prizes
We focused above on the pure e¤ect of status in contests: there were no other real prizes to drive e¤orts. We now consider contests where status is being indirectly (and solely) induced by the rank of monetary prizes in the respective hierarchy. Higher e¤ort leads to a (weakly) higher monetary prize, and, in addition, agents get positive utility proportional to the number of agents that have lower monetary prizes, and negative utility proportional to the number of agents that have higher monetary prizes 16 . In particular, we depart from the zero-sum world presented above.
A set of k monetary prizes V k V k 1 ::: V 1 and a family of division points fr i g k i=0 where r 0 = 0 and r k = n determines a partition with k categories: a contestant ranked in the top category k (i.e., a contestant whose e¤ort is among the top r k r k 1 ) receives a monetary prize of V k , a contestant in the second highest category receives a prize of V k 1 V k , and so on till the lowest
Thus, a player who is awarded the i-th highest monetary prize V i perceives in fact a total prize (money + status) of :
In order to make the problem non-trivial, we add here two realistic assumptions: 1) The contest designer is …nancially constrained: the total amount of monetary prizes cannot exceed a given amount P: Otherwise, it is obvious that large enough monetary prizes can always swamp any status e¤ects. 2) We impose an individual rationality constraint: the expected payo¤ of each contestant should be non-negative. Otherwise, contestants will leave without competing (the outside option being normalizes to zero).
By calculations similar to those performed for the case of pure status concerns, total e¤ort in a symmetric equilibrium is given by
Therefore, the designer's problem is as follows:
Note that constraint (3) guarantees that the expected payo¤ of the lowest type, who does not make any e¤ort, is non-negative. By a standard monotonicity argument, all other types will have positive expected payo¤s.
Theorem 5 If P > n; (i.e., if the available budget is as least as large as the number of contestants), the optimal solution to the designer's problem has the following structure: The designer induces a partition with two status categories such that the contestant with the highest e¤ ort receives a monetary prize V 2 = P (n 1);while all other contestants receive a monetary prize V 1 = 1: If P n , it is optimal to restrict entry to the contest until the condition above holds.
The intuition behind the optimality of the above described partition is as follows: Take a partition with two categories and a singleton in the top category, and re…ne it, for example, by dividing the low category in new "middle" and "low" categories. Then, the agents in the new low category perceive a decline in status, and this decline must be compensated by a higher monetary prize (in order to satisfy their individual rationality constraint). Since status is derived from monetary prizes, the agents in the new middle category must obtain a monetary prize that is at least as large as that of the agents in the new low category. Thus, via the budget constraint, the monetary prize of the agent in the top category must go down -this decline necessarily induces a decline in the e¤ort of high ability types. Since the strongest e¤ect of prizes is on high ability agents, the potential increase in e¤ort of middle ability agents is not enough to compensate for the decline at the top. This insight is related to the optimality of a unique "…rst" prize in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001) contest model with linear cost functions. That optimality naturally translates here into a partition in two status classes, with a singleton in the top category.
Conclusion
We have studied a contest model where heterogeneous agents who care about relative standing are ranked according to output, and are then partitioned into status categories. Our main results describe the structure of the optimal partition into status classes from the point of view of a designer that maximizes total output. The model explains ubiquitous phenomena such as top status class that contains a unique individual, and the proliferation of status classes in organizations where highskilled individuals are not rare. We also studied the interplay between pure status and monetary prizes.
As already mentioned in the introduction, in most real-life situations status is only partly determined by measurable di¤erences in monetary compensation. Social, cultural and other economic considerations that may be connected to a concern for relative position in a future interaction are also important determinants. Modeling a speci…c situation requires a simple combination of the two variants displayed here, and the corresponding results will be driven by the relative strengths of the monetary versus the less tangible parts.
Finally, note that, in principle, a analysis analogous to ours is possible for other agents'utility functions, or other designer's goals. In particular, for given, …xed utility functions, the equilibrium analysis is not a¤ected by the designer goal, and this can be modi…ed to conform the requirements of various applications. 
Appendix
A few useful facts about order statistics:
It is well-known that:
Let F n i (s) , i = 1; 2; :::n denote the probability that a player's type s ranks exactly i-th highest among n random variables distributed according to F . Then
De…ning F n;n 1 0; and F 0;n 1 1; it is immediate that the relation between F i;n (s) and F n i (s) is
Finally, let P i (s) be the probability of a player with type s being ranked in category i; i.e., her type is between the r i -th and r i 1 -th highest. Then:
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. Let a partition with k categories be given by f (0; 
where the …rst term is the utility of being in the lowest category; the second term is the utility of being in categories 2 till (k 1); the third term is the utility of being in the highest category, and the last term is the disutility of exerting e¤ort (s) :
The solution of the resulting di¤erential equation with boundary condition (0) = 0 is
Thus, total e¤ort is given by:
The above integral can be calculated by inserting formula 1 in 2 and by integrating by parts the constituent terms, who all have the form b R 1 0 R a 0 xf r;n 1 (x)dx f (a)da where b is a constant. Note that :
The last equality follows by a well known identity among order statistics (see David and Nagaraja, 2003 , page 44). Assembling all terms in equation 2, and recalling that r 0 = 0; and r k = n …nally yields:
(n r 1 ) 2 E (r 1 ; n)
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. Consider a partition fr i g k i=0 for a given number of contestants m: Total e¤ort is given by
Assume now that a designer faced with m + 1 contestants expands by one the size of the lowest status category: thus, consider the new partition fr 0 i g k i=0 where r 0 0 = 0; r 0 1 = r 1 + 1; r 0 2 = r 2 + 1; :::; r 0 k 1 = r k 1 + 1; r 0 k = m + 1: Total e¤ort for this new partition is given by We obtain:
The last inequality holds since, for all i; m; A i+1;m+1 stochastically dominates A i;m 18 : The claim follows now by starting from an optimal partition for m contestants, and expanding the size of the lowest category as above. Further eventual optimization of the partition for m + 1 contestants must weakly increase the total e¤ort even further, thus yielding the wished result.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. Suppose that, in an optimal partition with k categories, the j-th (1 j k) category contains more than one element. Divide the j-th category into two sub-categories and denote by r d the dividing point, r j 1 < r d < r j : Letting E(0; n) 0; the di¤erence in total e¤ort between the new and the initial partition is given by:
(r j r j 1 )(n r d )E(r d ; n) (r j r d )(n r j 1 )E (r j 1 ; n) (r d r j 1 )(n r j )E(r j ; n) Note that (n r) E (r; n) (n (r 1)) E (r 1; n) = (n r + 1) [E (r; n) E (r 1; n)] E (r; n)
By Barlow and Proschan's Lemma about IF R distributions, and by the fact that E (r; n) is decreasing in r; it immediately follows that [(n r) E (r; n) (n (r 1)) E (r 1; n)] is decreasing in r: Therefore E (k+1) total E (k) total > 0: This contradicts the assumption that the initial partition was optimal. Therefore, each category in the optimal partition must contain a unique element.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. The designer's problem is:
(n r i )(r i+1 r i 1 )E(r i ; n) +
(n r i )E(r i ; n)(V i+1 V i ) subject to : 1) 1 k n
(r i r i 1 )V i = P Assume …rst that a given partition with k status categories is …xed. We derive the optimal allocation of money prizes consistent with such a partition. Subsequently, we …nd the optimal partition.
Note that dE (k) total dV 1 < 0 , and therefore V 1 = n r 1 : The maximization problem reduces to:
(n r i )E(r i ; n)(V i+1 V i ) subject to:
(r i r i 1 )V i = P : V k V k 1 ::::V 1 = n r 1
Assuming that all the constraints V k :::: V 1 = n r 1 are binding, the Lagrangian is
The …rst order conditions are dL dV i = [(n r i 1 )E (r i 1 ; n) (n r i )E (r i ; n)] 0 (r i r i 1 ) i = 0; i = 1; ::::; k
The solution of this problem is:
V k 1 = ::: = V 1 = (n r 1 );
V k = P r k 1 (n r 1 ) n r k 1 0 = E(r k 1 ; n); i = [(n r i 1 )E (r i 1 ; n) (n r i )E (r i ; n)] 0 (r i r i 1 ), i = 1; ::; k
Note that : i = [(n r i 1 )E (r i 1 ; n) (n r i )E (r i ; n)] 0 (r i r i 1 ) < (r i r i 1 )(E(r i ; n) E(r k 1 ; n)) 0
That is, our assumption that all the constraints V k 1 ::: V 1 = n r 1 are binding (V k n r 1
is not binding) was correct. Now, at the optimal solution, total e¤ort is given by
(n r i )(r i+1 r i 1 )E(r i ; n) + E(r k 1 ; n)(P n(n r 1 ))
For a partition with k = 2 with division point r 0 1 , the above formula yields:
which is maximized for r 0 1 = n 1: Noting that
(n r i )(r i+1 r i 1 ) = n(n r 1 ); and that for any k, r k 1 n 1 , we obtain that
= P E(n 1; n)
(n r i )(r i+1 r i 1 )[E(r i ; n) E(r k 1 ; n)] 0
Thus, a partition with two status categories where the top category contains a unique element is optimal.
